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Abstract—Hybrid systems model checking is a great success
in guaranteeing the safety of computerized control cyber-physical
systems (CPS). However, when applying hybrid systems model
checking to Medical Device Plug-and-Play (MDPnP) CPS, we
encounter two challenges due to the complexity of human body:
i) there are no good offline differential equation based models for
many human body parameters; ii) the complexity of human body
can result in many variables, complicating the system model. In
an attempt to address the challenges, we propose to alter the
traditional approach of offline hybrid systems model checking of
time-unbounded (i.e., long-run) future behavior to online hybrid
systems model checking of time-bounded (i.e., short-run) future
behavior. According to this proposal, online model checking runs
as a real-time task to prevent faults. To meet the real-time
requirements, certain design patterns must be followed, which
brings up the co-design issue. We propose two sets of system co-
design patterns for hard real-time and soft real-time respectively.
To evaluate our proposals, a case study on laser tracheotomy
MDPnP is carried out. The study shows the necessity of online
model checking. Furthermore, test results based on real-world
human subject trace show the feasibility and effectiveness of our
proposed co-design.
I. INTRODUCTION
Thanks to the rapid development of embedded systems
technology, we now have thousands of kinds of embedded
medical devices. So far, these devices are mainly designed for
isolated use. However, people envision that by coordinating
these devices, we can significantly increase medical treatment
safety, capability, and efficiency. This vision triggered the
launch of the Medical Device Plug-and-Play (MDPnP) [1]
effort, which aims to enable the safe composition and collab-
oration of disparate embedded devices in medical contexts. An
MDPnP system is a typical Cyber-Physical System (CPS) [2].
On the one hand, it involves cyber-world discrete computer
logic of various embedded medical devices. On the other
hand, it involves physical-world patient-in-the-loop, which is
a continuous complex biochemical system.
The top concern of any MDPnP system is safety. In the
cyber-world, for a safety-critical system, people often carry
out model checking [3] before the system is put online. In
such case, model checking builds an offline model of the
system, and checks the system’s possible behaviors in the time-
unbounded future (i.e., infinite horizon). Only after passing
model checking may the system be allowed to run.
This practice is a great success. For CPS verification, the
state-of-the-art model checking tools are the hybrid systems
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model checking tools [4][5], which integrate the discrete
automata models with the continuous differential equation (and
other control theory) models. Today, hybrid systems model
checking can already analyze many computerized control
systems, i.e., control CPS.
The success of hybrid model checking in control CPS
inspires the interest to apply it in MDPnP CPS. However,
this faces a major challenge: in most MDPnP CPS, there are
no good offline models to describe the complex biochemical
system of the patient [6]. Even if some vital signs can be
modeled offline, the models may not (with some exceptions
[7]) fit into existing hybrid systems model checking tools,
which mainly use linear differential equations to describe the
physical world.
To deal with the above challenges, we propose to alter
the traditional practice of offline model checking of hybrid
system’s behavior in the infinite horizon. Instead, we carry
out periodical online model checking. In every period, we
only model check the hybrid system’s behavior in the next
(few) period(s); i.e., we only model check the hybrid system’s
behavior in finite horizon.
The merits of the proposed approach are as follows. First,
though many human body parameters are hard to model
offline, their online behaviors in finite horizon are quite
predictable. For example, after injecting 1ml of morphine, it
is hard to accurately predict the blood oxygen level curve
in the next 40 minutes, as it depends on too many factors,
even including the patient’s emotion [8][9]. However, it is
easy to predict the blood oxygen level curve in the next 4
seconds: it cannot plunge from 100% to 10%, nor show a
saw-toothed wave form; instead, it has to be smooth, which
can be effectively described with existing tools, such as
linear regression. Also, within short finite horizon, we can
approximate many variables as constants, and/or approximate
nonlinear behaviors as linear behaviors. This would further
simplify our model and computation.
The proposed approach can be formalized as follows. Given
an MDPnP system S , we periodically sample the observ-
able state parameters every T seconds. At time instance kT
(k = 0, 1, 2, . . .), we build a hybrid system model (i.e., the
“online model”) of S with the observed numerical values of
state parameters, and verify its safety in the time interval
[kT, (k + 1)T ] (i.e., within only finite horizon). If the online
model is proven safe, the system can run for another T
seconds. Otherwise, the system immediately switches to an
application dependant fall-back plan.
Such model checking must finish within bounded and short
time, i.e. real-time, to allow decision making (on whether
to run the system for another T seconds or switch to fall-
back plan) before any fault happens. To support real-time, the
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MDPnP CPS design must follow certain patterns, which brings
up the issue of hybrid systems model checking and CPS co-
design.
In the rest of the paper, we discuss our proposed co-design
approach through the context of laser tracheotomy, a represen-
tative MDPnP application [7][10]. Section II introduces the
background on hybrid systems model checking; Section III
proposes our online hybrid systems modeling approach; Sec-
tion IV proposes the corresponding system design patterns;
Section V evaluates our approach; Section VI further examines
our proposal under relaxed assumptions; Section VII discusses
related work; and Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
Hybrid systems model checking is first proposed by Alur,
Henzinger, et al. [11][12][13] and has since evolved into a
family of state-of-the-art tools in CPS. The main idea is to
combine the discrete automata models of computer logic with
continuous differential equation models of control systems,
which leads to the modeling tool of hybrid automata.
A. Syntax
Following [12]’s conventions on symbols, a
hybrid automaton A is syntactically a tuple of
A = (~x, ~x0, V, v0, inv, dif, E, act, L, syn), where
~x is a vector of n data variables ~x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn). ~x
is regarded as a function of time, and we use ~˙x to denote the
first order derivative of ~x. We also use ~x′ = (x′
1
, x′
2
, . . . , x′n) to
denote the new values of ~x after an event (see the definitions
for E and act). A specific evaluation of ~x, denoted as ~s =
(s1, s2, . . . , sn) ∈ R
n is called a data state of A. In addition,
Boolean values of true and false can be denoted with real
number 1 and 0 respectively; hence a data variable can also
serve as a Boolean variable.
~x0 is the initial data state.
V is a set of locations, a.k.a., control locations, where
different control laws apply. Each location corresponds to a
vertex in the graphical representation of hybrid automaton A.
A state of hybrid automaton A is denoted as (v,~s), where
v ∈ V and ~s ∈ Rn is a data state.
v0 is the initial location.
inv is the location invariants, a function that assigns each
location v ∈ V a set of inequalities over data variables ~x. That
is, when in location v, the value of ~x must satisfy inv(v).
dif is the continuous activities, a function that assigns
each location v ∈ V a set of inequalities over ~˙x and ~x. That
is, when in location v, the values of ~˙x and ~x must satisfy
dif(v).
E is the set of events, a.k.a. transitions: edges between
locations. Formally, E ⊆ V ×V . For an event e = (v, v′) ∈ E,
v is the source location and v′ is the target location.
act is the discrete actions, a function assigns to each
event e = (v, v′) ∈ E a set of inequalities over ~x and ~x′,
where ~x′ = (x′
1
, x′
2
, . . . , x′n) refers to the new value of ~x
after event e. The event e = (v, v′) is enabled only when the
value of ~x in v satisfies act(e), and the new value of ~x′ after
the event is chosen nondeterministically such that act(e) is
satisfied. For example, suppose ~x = (x1), then for act(e) =
(x1 ≤ 3 ∧ x
′
1
≤ 5 ∧ x′
1
≥ 5), event e is only enabled when
x1 ≤ 3; and after the event, x1 is assigned the new value of 5.
Like this example, if ~x and ~x′ do not mix in any inequalities
in act(e), and ~x′ has a deterministic value ~s′, then we can call
the subset of inequalities involving only ~x to be the guard of
event e, and event e updates ~x to ~s′, denoted as ~x := ~s′.
L is a set of synchronization labels.
syn is the synchronization function that assigns each
event e ∈ E an l ∈ L. L and syn are for composition
of multiple hybrid automata. Suppose we have two hybrid
automata A1 = (~x1, ~x01, V1, v
0
1
, inv1, dif1, E1, act1, L1, syn1)
and A2 = (~x2, ~x02, V2, v02 , inv2, dif2, E2, act2, L2, syn2), if
e1 ∈ E1, e2 ∈ E2 and syn1(e1) = syn2(e2), then event
e1 and e2 must always take place together.
Furthermore, when inv, dif , and act only involve linear
inequalities, and dif does not involve ~x, hybrid automaton A
is called linear hybrid automaton (LHA)[11].
Reference [12] also describes how to combine several
hybrid automata into one hybrid automaton. Particularly, the
location set of the combined hybrid automaton Vcomb =
V1×V2× . . .×Vn, where Vi (i = 1, . . . , n) is the location set
of the ith component hybrid automaton; and “×” is Cartesian
product. For v ∈ Vcomb, we use v|i to denote the projection
of v on Vi.
B. Semantics
We follow the semantics and the corresponding symbol
definitions of [12]. Due to page limit, interested readers shall
refer to [12] for these definitions.
We, however, want to emphasize that to simplify narration,
in the following, unless explicitly denoted, “model checking”
refers to “model checking of finite-horizon reachability seman-
tics”, i.e., whether a state σ of hybrid automaton A satisfies
ϕ1∃U≤Tϕ2, where ϕ1 and ϕ2 are state predicates of A, and
T is the finite-horizon duration.
III. HYBRID SYSTEMS MODELING APPROACH
In this section, we shall use laser tracheotomy, a represen-
tative MDPnP application [7][10], as the context to discuss
the proper hybrid systems modeling approach for MDPnP. We
shall see through this case study why offline model checking
must be replaced by online model checking.
Laser tracheotomy MDPnP interlocks various medical de-
vices to increase safety. It has the following entities (see
Fig. 1):
Patient: the patient that receives the surgery;
O2 Sensor: the patient’s trachea (windpipe) oxygen level
sensor;
SpO2 Sensor: the patient’s blood oxygen level sensor;
Ventilator: the medical device that administrates the patient’s
respirations;
Surgeon: the doctor that conducts the surgery;
Laser Scalpel: the medical device for the surgeon to cut the
patient’s trachea;
Supervisor: the central computer that connects all medical
devices and makes decisions to guarantee safety.
Fig. 1. Layout of Laser Tracheotomy MDPnP
The application context is as follows. In the surgery, due
to general anesthesia, the patient is paralyzed, hence has to
depend on the ventilator to breathe. The ventilator has three
modes: pumping out (the patient inhales oxygen), pumping in
(the patient exhales), and hold (the patient exhales naturally
due to chest weight). However, when the laser scalpel is to cut
the patient’s trachea, the oxygen level inside the trachea must
be lower than a threshold. Otherwise, the laser may trigger fire.
Therefore, before the laser scalpel is allowed to emit laser,
the ventilator must have stopped pumping out (oxygen) for
a while. On the other hand, the ventilator can neither stop
pumping out for too long, or the patient will suffocate due to
too low blood oxygen level.
In summary, the behavior of laser tracheotomy MDPnP must
comply with the following safety rules:
Safety Rule 1: when the laser scalpel emits laser, the patient’s
trachea oxygen level must not exceed a threshold ΘO2 ;
Safety Rule 2: the patient’s blood oxygen level never reaches
below a threshold ΘSpO2 .
Note that the setting of constant thresholds ΘO2 and ΘSpO2 are
medical experts’ responsibility and are beyond the coverage of
this paper.
The formal expressions of safety rules will become clear
by the end of Section III-B, when the corresponding hybrid
automata are defined.
A. Traditional Approach: Offline Modeling
Because the laser tracheotomy MDPnP involves both dis-
crete medical device logic and physical world patient, it is a
hybrid system. Therefore we try to model laser tracheotomy
MDPnP with hybrid automata.
The traditional approach of model checking, including
hybrid systems model checking, is carried out offline. That
is, the model is built and its infinite horizon behavior is
verified before the system runs. We choose to start with this
approach. As a common practice, our offline modeling of laser
tracheotomy MDPnP assumes a global time t: t is initialized
to 0 second, and t˙ ≡ 1.
Intuitively, we intend to start with modeling the patient, the
core entity of the laser tracheotomy MDPnP. However, the
patient’s behavior is directly administrated by the ventilator,
which has to be understood first.
The ventilator is basically a compressible air reservoir [14]:
a cylinder of height Hvent(t) (0 ≤ Hvent(t) ≤ 0.3(m)). The
movement of the ventilator cylinder (indicated by H˙vent(t))
Fig. 2. Offline hybrid automaton of Ventilator
pumps out/in oxygen/air to/from patient, thus helping the pa-
tient to inhale/exhale. The ventilator behavior is defined by the
hybrid automaton in Fig. 2. The automaton has three locations:
PumpOut, PumpIn, and Hold. When the supervisor (will be
discussed later in Fig. 8) allows the ventilator to work (i.e.,
when data variable LaserApprove is set to false), the ventila-
tor switches between pumping out (where H˙vent = −0.1m/s)
and pumping in (where H˙vent = +0.1m/s). This causes the
patient to inhale oxygen and exhale respectively. When the
supervisor pauses the ventilator (i.e., when LaserApprove is
set to true), the ventilator cylinder will try to restore to its
maximum height (0.3m) and holds there until the ventilator is
allowed again (LaserApprove set to false).
Fig. 3. Offline hybrid automaton of Patient. Though good offline models for
O˙2 exists [7], the offline model for ˙SpO2 is still an open problem. Also note
that in location Hold (which corresponds to ventilator Hold), the patient still
exhale due to chest weight.
With the ventilator hybrid automaton at hand, we can now
start modeling the patient. The patient hybrid automaton (see
Fig. 3) is tightly coupled with the ventilator hybrid automaton
(see Fig. 2). It also has three locations: Inhale, Exhale, and
Hold, which respectively correspond to the ventilator hybrid
automaton’s locations of PumpOut, PumpIn, and Hold. The
events between the three locations are also triggered by
corresponding events from the ventilator hybrid automaton.
Inside of each location are the offline continuous time
models for trachea oxygen level O2(t) and blood oxygen
level SpO2(t). Unfortunately, though there are good offline
models for O˙2(t) [7], the offline model for ˙SpO2(t) is still
an open problem [8][9]. This is because blood oxygen level
are strongly affected by complex human body biochemical
reactions, even emotions.
Therefore, we fail to model SpO2(t) offline, and hence
fail to model the patient offline. What is worse, as the
patient model is an indispensable component of the holistic
offline model, the offline model checking of laser tracheotomy
MDPnP fails.
B. Proposed Approach: Online Modeling
The failure of offline approach forces us to consider the
proposed online approach (see Section I) instead. Specifically,
we sample the patient’s trachea/blood oxygen level every T
seconds. Suppose at t0 = kT (k ∈ Z≥0), we get the most
up-to-date trachea/blood oxygen level sensor reading Ô2(t0)
and ŜpO2(t0), we can then build the hybrid systems model
for interval [t0, t0 + T ] as following.
First, same as the offline model checking, we use global
variable t to represent the global clock, except that now t is
initialized to t0 and stops at (t0 + T ) as we only care about
the system’s finite horizon safety until (t0 + T ).
(a) non-linear model
(b) linear hybrid automaton (LHA) model, where Ô2inhale, Ô2exhale,
and Ô2hold are constants, which can be estimated from historical data.
Fig. 4. Online hybrid automaton of Patient.
The patient hybrid automaton now looks like Fig. 4(a). The
biggest change is the continuous time model for the blood
oxygen level SpO2(t). In offline model checking, we have to
describe the infinite horizon behavior of SpO2(t), which is an
open problem. However, in online model checking, we only
have to describe SpO2(t)’s behavior in interval [t0, t0 + T ],
where T is just a few seconds. If we only look into such
short-run future, blood oxygen level curve SpO2(t) is very
describable and predictable. For example, it cannot plunge
from 100% to 10% within just 4 seconds, neither can it show
a saw-toothed wave form. Instead, it must be smooth; in fact
smooth enough to be safely predicted with standard tools (such
as linear regression) based on its past history.
In Fig. 4(a), we use a simple way to predict/describe
SpO2(t) in t ∈ [t0, t0 + T ]:
˙SpO
2
(t) ≡ ˜˙SpO
2
(t0), ∀t ∈ [t0, t0 + T ],
where ˙SpO
2
(t) is the derivative of SpO2(t) at time t; and˜˙SpO
2
(t0) is the estimation (e.g., via linear regression) of
˙SpO
2
(t0) based on SpO2(t)’s history recorded during (t0 −
Tpast, t0). Tpast is a configuration constant picked empirically
offline. In our case study, we pick Tpast = 6 seconds.
Also, depending on the patient’s state at time t0, the initial
location can be Inhale, Exhale, or Hold. Whichever location
it is, the initial value of trachea/blood oxygen value should be
Ô2(t0) and ŜpO2(t0) respectively.
The patient model of Fig. 4(a) can be further simplified.
Human subject respiration traces (see Fig. 5) show that the
values of ainhale, aexhale, and ahold in Fig. 4(a) are large: so
large that O2(t) almost behaves as rectangular waves when the
patient hybrid automaton changes locations. Therefore, we can
simplify Fig. 4(a) into Fig. 4(b), where O2(t) remains constant
within every location, and its value is only updated on the
corresponding transitions. This simplification turns the patient
hybrid automaton (in fact the whole system) into an linear
hybrid automaton (LHA), which is much easier to verify [15].
Fig. 5. A typical example excerpt of trachea CO2 level trace (measured on
human subjects with Nonin 9843 [16]); note O2(t) = C1 − C2 · CO2(t),
where C1 and C2 are two constants, whose derivation can be found in classic
physics textbooks [17].
We now check other laser tracheotomy MDPnP entities.
First, since the online model only looks into the short-run
future of [t0, t0 + T ], where T is also the sensor sampling
period, there are no interactions with sensors throughout the
interval of (t0, t0 + T ). Therefore, in online model checking,
the hybrid automata of O2 sensor and SpO2 sensor are
unnecessary.
Next, the ventilator hybrid automaton in online model (see
Fig. 6) is almost the same as its offline counterpart (see Fig. 2)
A main difference is that the online model’s initial location can
be any location depending on the ventilator’s state at t0.
The last entity that directly interacts with the patient is the
laser scalpel. We can actually model the laser scalpel and the
surgeon with one hybrid automaton: the laser scalpel hybrid
automaton (see Fig. 7).
Fig. 6. Online hybrid automaton of Ventilator.
Fig. 7. Online hybrid automaton of Laser Scalpel. This is the only automaton
that sets the value of state variable LaserReq.
The automaton’s key elements are the two Boolean vari-
ables: LaserApprove and LaserReq.
LaserApprove indicates whether the supervisor (see Fig. 1)
allows the laser scalpel to emit laser (true for yes and false
for no). Its value can only be set by the supervisor hybrid
automaton (see Fig. 8), which is to be explained later.
LaserReq indicates whether the laser scalpel wants to emit
laser (true for yes and false for no). Its value can only be
set by the laser scalpel hybrid automaton. The value setting is
triggered by following events: i) when in LaserIdle, the sur-
geon can request emitting laser through eventSurgeonRequest,
which sets LaserReq to true; ii) when in LaserRequesting
or LaserEmitting, the surgeon can request stopping laser
emission through eventSurgeonCancel and eventSurgeonStop
respectively, which both set LaserReq to false; iii) when in
LaserEmitting, the supervisor can stop the laser emission at
any time by setting LaserApprove to false, which triggers
eventSupervisorStop and sets LaserReq to false.
The four possible combinations of LaserApprove and
LaserReq’s values define the major locations in the
laser scalpel hybrid automaton: LaserIdle, LaserRequesting,
LaserEmitting, and LaserCanceling. Particularly, laser scalpel
emits laser in and only in LaserEmitting. There is an additional
location, LaserToEmit, which models the additional delay
Tmaxtoemit between LaserRequesting and LaserEmitting. This
delay is to further ensure oxygen level in trachea falls below
threshold before the actual laser emission.
The laser scalpel hybrid automaton’s initial location can be
anywhere depending on the laser scalpel’s state at t0. One
thing to note is that all variables should be initialized to their
actual value at t0. For example, if initial location is LaserIdle,
and Laser Scalpel has been idling for 10 seconds by t0, then
tidle shall be initialized to 10 seconds instead of 0.
Fig. 8. Online hybrid automaton of Supervisor. This is the only automaton
that sets the value of data variable LaserApprove. Note tapprove can be
totally removed from the model in soft real-time online model checking.
Finally, all medical device entities are interlocked by the
supervisor, the central decision making computer (see Fig. 1).
The supervisor maneuvers data variable LaserApprove. Set-
ting LaserApprove to true/false determines the off/on of
the ventilator and the permission/denial of emitting laser
respectively.
The value setting decisions are made dependent on the
most up-to-date information on the patient’s trachea oxygen
level O2(t) and blood oxygen level SpO2(t). Based on the
models given in the patient hybrid automaton (see Fig. 4),
we can predict O2(t) and SpO2(t) for any t ∈ [t0, t0 + T ].
Therefore, we can construct the supervisor hybrid automaton
as Fig. 8, which directly uses O2(t) and SpO2(t) predicted
by the patient hybrid automaton for decision making.
The supervisor hybrid automaton has two locations:
LaserDisapproved and LaserApproved.
When in LaserDisapproved, the supervisor needs eventSu-
pervisorApprove to move to LaserApproved. This event is
triggered when the following prerequisites all hold:
Prerequisite 1: the laser scalpel is requesting emitting laser
(i.e., LaserReq = true);
Prerequisite 2: O2(t) is less than threshold ΘO2 ;
Prerequisite 3: SpO2(t) is greater than threshold ΘSpO2 .
Prerequisite 4: tdisapprove ≥ Tmindisapprove. This is a minimal
dwelling time requirement to guarantee the automaton’s non-
zeno property, which is important for effective model checking
[3]. This requirement also models the time cost in switching
between LaserDisapproved and LaserApproved modes in the
supervisor.
Through eventSupervisorApprove, the supervisor approves
the emission of laser by setting LaserApprove to true. This
event also resets a clock tapprove, and moves the location to
LaserApproved.
Like tdisapprove, clock tapprove is for guaranteeing a mini-
mal dwelling time of Tminapprove in LaserApproved. After that, if
Prerequisite 1 no longer holds (i.e., when LaserReq becomes
false), the eventNormalDisapprove is triggered. This event
moves the supervisor back to location LaserDisapproved and
resets LaserApprove to false, and tdisapprove to 0.
In contrast to eventNormalDisapprove,
eventAbnormalDisapprove is triggered when the supervisor
is in LaserApproved while Prerequisite 2 or 3 stops to
hold. This event also moves the supervisor back to location
LaserDisapproved and resets LaserApprove/tdisapprove to
false/0 respectively.
Finally, same as the other online hybrid automata, the initial
location for the online supervisor automaton can be either
LaserDisapproved or LaserApproved, depending on the state
of the supervisor at time t0; and the variables should be
initialized to the actual values at t0.
With the above hybrid automata model of the laser tra-
cheotomy MDPnP, we can formally express Safety Rule 1
and 2 (see the beginning of Section III) as follows.
Safety Rule 1: For any given initial state σ0, σ0 6|=
true∃U
≤T
⋃
v∈Vcomp∧v|ls=LaserEmitting(v,O2(t) ≥ ΘO2);
Safety Rule 2: For any given initial state σ0, σ0 6|=
true∃U
≤T
⋃
v∈Vcomp
(v, SpO2(t) ≤ ΘSpO2);
where Vcomp is the location set of the combined automaton of
the Ventilator, Patient, Laser Scalpel, and Supervisor; v|ls is
v’s projection on the Laser Scalpel automaton location set.
When model checking any one of the above safety rules, a
“yes” answer means the system is safe; while a “no” answer
means this system may reach unsafe state.
IV. SYSTEM CO-DESIGN PATTERN
The evolution from offline model checking to online model
checking must also be matched with system design changes.
A. Hard Real-Time System Design
First, the overall system architecture shall integrate online
model checking as a runtime fault prediction and prevention
mechanism. A straightforward thought is to run online model
checking periodically with period T . It predicts possible faults
in the next period by checking whether unsafe states are
reachable within the finite horizon of T . If so, the system
switches to a fall-back plan for the next period. The fall-
back plan is application dependent. For laser tracheotomy
MDPnP, a simple fall-back plan is that the supervisor locks
LaserApprove at false, hence forbidding laser emission and
keeping the ventilator active.
The above overall architecture works if online modeling
and verification costs 0 time. In practice, this is an over
simplification. However, if the online model checking has a
worst case execution time bound D < T , then we can run
the online model checking as a hard real-time task and use
pipelining to carry out fault prediction and prevention. This is
formally described by the algorithm in Fig. 9, which, without
loss of generality, runs a pipeline with T = 2D.
//This code assumes online model checking (see line 4, 5) can always
//finish within hard real-time deadline D = T
2
.
1. main(){
2. wait till current time t satisfies (tmod T
2
= 0);
3. t0 := t;
4. read sensors and build online model A;
5. if (A may reach unsafe states in [t0, t0 + T ]){
6. /*non-blocking call:*/ switch the hybrid system to fall-back plan;
7. }else
/*non-blocking call:*/ allow the hybrid system to run normally;
8. goto line 2;
9. }
Fig. 9. Overall system architecture for hard real-time online model checking,
with worst case execution time bound of D (for line 4, 5). Without loss of
generality, the code runs a pipeline with T = 2D (see line 2, 5). To “run
normally” means that the hybrid system runs according to A’s descriptions.
It is known that for certain types of hybrid automata
[18][19][20][21], reachability verification time cost upper
bound exists. For such systems, we can apply Fig. 9’s hard
real-time online model checking.
However, in general sense, hybrid automata reachability
verification is undecidable and thus a time cost upper bound
(hard real-time deadline guarantee) does not exist [3]. Even
for those decidable hybrid automata, the time cost bounds are
often too big (non-polynomial) to be practical [21]. Therefore,
soft real-time online model checking instead has more practical
value.
B. Soft Real-Time System Design
In software real-time online model checking, we directly
specify a desired deadline D, without requiring hard real-
time guarantee. The selection method of D is empirical: as
long as D makes deadline misses satisfactorily rare and the
online modeling satisfactorily accurate. For example, we can
use standard benchmarks to assist finding a desirable D (see
Section V-B).
Even though deadline D may be missed, soft real-time
online model checking can still serve the MDPnP hybrid
system in at least two ways: one conservative and the other
aggressive, as described by the pseudo code in Fig. 10.
In the conservative way, if online model checking misses
deadline D, the MDPnP hybrid system always switches to the
(application dependent) fall-back plan. Assuming the modeling
is accurate, the conservative way can prevent all accidents.
However, if deadline misses are too often, the system will
frequently switch to fall-back plan, annoying the users. In
other words, the conservative way can raise a lots of false
alarms, but can prevent all accidents.
Take our laser tracheotomy MDPnP for example. Every time
the online model checking misses the D seconds deadline on
safety check, the supervisor will disapprove any laser emission
request for the next D seconds (i.e., the “fall-back plan”).
Instead, only when the online model checking confirms safety
within the D seconds deadline will the supervisor follow
Fig. 8’s descriptions in the next D seconds.
In the aggressive way, if online model checking misses
deadline D, the MDPnP system does not switch to fall-back
plan. The aggressive way only invokes fall-back plan when it
//Online model checking deadline is D = T
2
(see line 4, 6, 7, 11, 12).
1. main(mode){
2. wait till current time t satisfies (tmod T
2
= 0);
3. t0 := t;
4. read sensors and build online model A;
5. if (mode =“conservative way”){
6. if ((A may reach unsafe states in [t0, t0 + T ])
7. or (current time t ≥ t0 + T2 )){
8. /*non-blocking call:*/ switch the hybrid system to fall-back plan;
9. }else
/*non-blocking call:*/ allow the hybrid system to run normally;
10. else {//mode =“aggressive way”
11. if ((not (A may reach unsafe states in [t0, t0 + T ]))
12. or (current time t ≥ t0 + T2 )){
13. /*non-blocking call:*/ allow the hybrid system to run normally;
14. }else
/*non-blocking call:*/ switch the hybrid system to fall-back plan;
15. }
16. goto line 2;
17. }
Fig. 10. Revised overall system architecture that allows soft real-time online
model checking. Without loss of generality, the code runs a pipeline with T =
2D (see line 2, 6, 11), where D = T
2
is the real-time online model checking
deadline. To “run normally” means that the hybrid system runs according to
A’s descriptions.
is certain the system is facing risks. In other words, the aim
of aggressive way is not to prevent all accidents, but to reduce
accidents. In medical practice, a method that can significantly
reduce accidents is still a useful method; in fact, most medical
routines are of such nature [22].
Again take our laser tracheotomy MDPnP for example.
Every time the online model checking misses the D seconds
deadline on safety check, the supervisor will nevertheless
follow Fig. 8’s descriptions in the next D seconds. The fall-
back plan (that the supervisor disapproves any laser emission
requests) only kicks in when online model checking is certain
that unsafe state is reachable within the D seconds deadline.
Therefore, the online model checking is not to eliminate all
possible accidents that a human surgeon may make, but to
reduce such accidents as an additional protection.
To summarize, each deadline miss means the online model
checking is uncertain about the safety of the MDPnP hybrid
system in the next D seconds. In the conservative way, the
system always switches to the fall-back plan when the online
model checking ends up uncertain (of course it also switches to
the fall-back plan when the online model checking is certain of
pending risks). In the aggressive way, the system only switches
to fall-back plan when the online model checking is certain of
pending risks.
V. EVALUATIONS
To validate our proposed approach, especially the effective-
ness (usefulness) of soft real-time online model checking for
MDPnP (the “conservative way” and the “aggressive way”,
see Section IV-B), we carry out evaluations using real-world
trachea/blood oxygen level traces.
A. Effectiveness
We run soft real-time online model checking program
P (see Fig. 10) upon emulated trachea/blood oxygen level
(a)
(b)
Fig. 11. Human subjects roles and behaviors. (a) HS1; (b) HS2.
sensors for 1200 seconds. We choose soft real-time deadline
to be D = 2 seconds. That is, every D = T
2
= 2 seconds, P
queries the emulated sensors for trachea/blood oxygen level
readings, then builds online model and verifies the system
safety for the coming finite horizon of T = 4 seconds.
We have two sets of 1200-second traces for the emulated
sensors.
The first set of 1200-second traces comes from PhysioNet
[23], a comprehensive online public database (set up by NIH,
NIBIB, and NIGMS) of real-world medical traces logged by
hospitals. For simplicity, we call it “PhysioNet Traces”.
The other set of 1200-second traces comes from our own
experiments on two human subjects. Human Subject 1 (HS1)
mimics the combined behavior of the supervisor, laser scalpel,
and surgeon in laser tracheotomy MDPnP. As shown by
Fig. 11(a), HS1 randomly swaps between holding the flag of
“Laser Disapproved” and “Laser Approved”. Human Subject 2
(HS2) mimics the combined behavior of the ventilator and the
patient in the laser tracheotomy MDPnP. When HS1 holds the
“Laser Disapproved” flag, HS2 breathes smoothly at the rate
of 6 seconds per respiration-cycle. When HS1 holds the “Laser
Approved” flag, HS2 first tries to exhale (to his very best) and
then holds his breath until HS1 raises the “Laser Disapproved”
flag again (in case HS1 holds the “Laser Approved” flag for
too long, HS2 is free to abort the experiment by resuming
normal breath). Meanwhile, HS2’s trachea and blood oxygen
level are recorded by Nonin 9843 [16]. We call the derived
traces the “HKPolyU Traces”.
The two emulated sensors read corresponding real-world
traces (PhysioNet or HKPolyU) respectively. Based on the
readings, P builds online hybrid systems models as described
in Section III-B, and verifies it. The specific modeling and ver-
ification software used is PHAVer [15], a well-known hybrid
systems model checking tool. Our computation platform is a
Lenovo Thinkpad X201 with Intel Core i5 and 2.9G memory;
the OS is 32-bit Ubuntu 10.10.
For each trace, throughout its 1200-second emulation pe-
riod, program P carries out 1200/D = 1200/2 = 600 trials of
online modeling and verifications. The statistics of execution
time cost is depicted by Table I.
The statistics show that more than 97.8% of the online
model checking trials finished within the D = 2 (sec) deadline.
In other words, only no more than 2.2% of the online model
checking trials missed deadline.
Assume the modeling is accurate (which is going to be
validated soon), in case P runs the “conservative way” (see
Fig. 10), the above result means not only all accidents are
prevented, the false alarm probability is no more than 2.2%.
In case P runs the “aggressive way”, the above result means
more than 97.8% of accidents can be reduced (every time the
system can reach unsafe states in the next D seconds, there is
a ≥ 97.8% chance that online model checking finishes within
deadline, hence triggering the fall-back plan). Such reduction
of accidents is significant according to the standards of medical
practice [22]. In either case, the results provide strong evidence
that (soft) real-time online model checking is effective (i.e.,
feasible and useful).
TABLE I
STATISTICS OF EXECUTION TIME COST OF ONLINE MODEL CHECKING
(UNIT: SECOND; DEADLINE D = 2 SECONDS)
% of trials Execution time of those
missed caught deadline (secs)
deadline Min Max Mean Std
PhysioNet Trace 2.2% 0.817 1.720 0.932 0.126
HKPolyU Trace 1.7% 0.818 1.940 0.965 0.146
To validate the assumption that the online modeling is
accurate, we carry out statistics on the prediction error of blood
oxygen level curve.
During the online model checking, at every time instance
t0 = kD (k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 599}, and D = 2 seconds), we
sample the blood oxygen level and predict (see Fig. 4) the
blood oxygen level curve in [t0, t0+T ] (T = 2D = 4 seconds).
Let the predicted blood oxygen level at time (t0 + T ) be
S˜pO
2
(t0 + T ). Let the PhysioNet/HKPolyU trace reading of
blood oxygen level at time (t0 + T ) be ŜpO2(t0 + T ). We
define the relative prediction error at time (t0 + T ) to be
ERRSpO2(t0 + T ) =
|ŜpO
2
(t0 + T )− S˜pO2(t0 + T )|
ŜpO
2
(t0 + T )
.
The statistics of the relative prediction errors throughout the
600 trials for each trace are depicted by Table II. The statistics
show that our online model checking’s predictions on the finite
horizon behavior of blood oxygen level curve match the real-
world traces quite accurately (with maximum relative error of
3.92%).
TABLE II
STATISTICS OF BLOOD OXYGEN LEVEL ONLINE MODELING RELATIVE
ERRORS (%)
Min Max Mean Std
PhysioNet Trace 0.03 2.53 0.51 0.52
HKPolyU Trace < 0.01 3.92 0.61 0.60
B. Selection of Online Modeling Period
Now we show why D = 2 seconds is an empirically
desirable online modeling period.
We use both the 1200-second PhysioNet Trace and the
1200-second HKPolyU Trace as benchmark, and try out
different values of D.
Table III shows the statistics on online modeling relative
errors under different Ds. The statistics show that D = 2
seconds incurs least maximum relative error compared to other
candidates. Note D = 2 seconds might not be the optimal
choice, but based on the evaluations on the 2400-second
medical traces, it turns out to be an empirically effective
choice. A lot of parameters used in medicine are derived from
such empirical studies.
TABLE III
ONLINE MODEL CHECKING RELATIVE ERROR STATISTICS UNDER
DIFFERENT DS
Trace D(sec) Relative Error (%)
Min Max Mean Std
2 0.03 2.53 0.51 0.52
PhysioNet 3 0.04 4.52 0.76 0.74
4 < 0.01 5.98 0.96 0.94
2 < 0.01 3.92 0.61 0.60
HKPolyU 3 < 0.01 4.81 0.90 0.90
4 < 0.01 6.29 1.18 1.12
VI. FURTHER DISCUSSION
So far, we have always been assuming that “the online
model is accurate”. If the online model is accurate, the online
model checking either misses deadline, or produces true-
positive/true-negative conclusions.
Interestingly, even without the “online model is accurate”
assumption, i.e., if the online model checking can produce
false-positive/false-negative conculsions, our proposed method
can still be useful for medical practices.
For ease of narration, we call our proposed online model
checking based MDPnP practice as “MDPnP-practice”; call
the corresponding online modeling and online model check-
ing as “MDPnP-online-modeling” and “MDPnP-online-model-
checking” respectively.
Still take the laser tracheotomy for example, Table IV lists
all possible cases for “MDPnP-practice”. We see that the upper
bounds of accident probability are
P consm = p(+)pm(−|+) (1)
and P aggrm = p(+) [pm(−|+) + pm(?|+)] (2)
respectively for “conservative mode” and “aggressive mode”,
where p(+) is the probability that unsafe states are reach-
able if Fig. 4’s online patient model is replaced with the
absolutely accurate model (the model in “God’s view”);
pm(−|+), pm(?|+) are respectively the conditional probability
that MDPnP-online-model-checking gives “negative” answer
(i.e., a false-negative answer), or misses deadline (i.e., cannot
give a deterministic answer). Note false-positive is not a big
concern as it will trigger fall-back plan, leaving no chances
for accidents (though may be a nuisance to the surgeon).
In comparison to MDPnP-practice, now let us study the
current-practice (i.e., the actual practice in nowadays hospi-
tals) of laser tracheotomy.
First, the role of supervisor (i.e. the procedure described
in Fig.8) is taken over by a human-supervisor. Usually, the
human-supervisor is the surgeon himself/herself; but for clar-
ity, let us differentiate the two persons.
TABLE IV
ALL POSSIBLE CASES FOR MDPNP PRACTICE
Reality Online-Model-
Checking Result
What Happens Accident
Possible?
positive scenario 1 No
positive negative scenario 2 Yes
deadline scenario 1 (cons) No
miss scenario 2 (aggr) Yes
negative no need to care no need to care No
positive: unsafe states are reachable.
negative: unsafe states are not reachable.
scenario 1: fall-back plan kicks in, which forbids use of laser and keeps
ventilator on; the worst case is that the surgeon may be annoyed.
scenario 2: the system run as what Fig. 4, 6, 7, and 8 describe.
Second, as for line 4 of the algorithm described in Fig. 10,
instead of MDPnP-online-modeling, the human-supervisor
uses his/her subjective judgement to model the patient in the
near future (e.g., replace˜˙SpO2(t0) in Fig. 4 with his/her sub-
jective prediction). We call this “subjective-online-modeling”.
Third, as for line 6 and 11 of the algorithm described in
Fig. 10, instead of MPnP-online-model-checking, the human-
supervisor uses his subjective judgement to decide whether
unsafe states are reachable. We call this “subjective-online-
model-checking”.
Therefore, reusing the same analysis on the MDPnP-
practice, we can derive the upper bounds of accident prob-
ability for the current-practice:
P consc = p(+)ps(−|+) (3)
and P aggrc = p(+) [ps(−|+) + ps(?|+)] (4)
respectively for “conservative mode” and “aggressive mode”,
where ps(−|+), ps(?|+) are respectively the conditional prob-
ability that subjective-online-model-checking gives “negative”
answer (i.e., a false-negative answer), or misses deadline (i.e.,
cannot give a deterministic answer).
Suppose we adopt the “conservative mode”. By comparing
Equation (1) and (3), we see the MDPnP-practice is safer than
the current-practice when
pm(−|+) ≤ ps(−|+). (5)
How to mathematically verify Inequality (5) is beyond the
scope of this paper. However, we can still verify empirically.
For example, if some well-established math model for pre-
dicting patient near-future behavior exists [9], then we’d better
use MDPnP-online-modeling rather than relying on subjective-
online-modeling. Or, we can carry out comparison using well-
known benchmark patient traces, to see which online-modeling
is more trustworthy.
The same thing is for “aggressive mode”, except that
Inequality (5) now becomes
pm(−|+) + pm(?|+) ≤ ps(−|+) + ps(?|+). (6)
VII. RELATED WORK
Our approach is different from the well-known runtime
verification [24]. Runtime verification aims to discover la-
tent bugs of programs by logging and analyzing the pro-
grams’ execution traces under varied inputs/configurations. It
is not for predicting/preventing faults before they ever happen;
whilst our approach is. For many medical CPS systems, the
cost/consequence of possible faults in test runs is high or even
unbearable. This necessitates our approach of predicting and
preventing faults before they ever happen.
Sen et al. [25] propose an online safety analysis method
for multithreaded programs. From the real execution trace,
the method is able to infer the causality relationships (partial
order) between variable access and write events happening in
different threads. Other execution paths, which comply with
the inferred causality relationships and may potentially hap-
pen, can then be identified. Safety analysis over those potential
paths will broaden the coverage of testing. However, this work
only focuses on how to infer other potential executions that
can take place in the past. Our work tries to predict the future
state of patient based on recent observations
Easwaran et al. [26], Qi et al. [27], and Harel et al. [28]
also propose bringing model checking online. But they are still
focusing on discrete (automata) model checking, rather than
hybrid systems model checking that this paper is about.
Sauter et al. [29] propose a lightweight hybrid-system model
checking method, which uses ordinary differential equations
(ODE) to predict temporal logic properties However, in the
MDPnP systems it is not uncommon to be lack of differential
equations governing patients dynamics, i.e., patients model.
Li et al. [30] propose one online model checking approach
aiming at automatically estimating parameters in simulation
models, which are often used for biological purpose to under-
stand complex regulatory mechanisms in cell.
Larsen et al. [31] propose an online model-based testing
tool for real-time systems, UPPAAL TRON. The tool is based
on UPPAAL engine and models real-time systems as timed
automata. Timed automaton is a sub-class of hybrid systems
where the directives of continuous variables are always 1,
whereas our online model checking of MDPnP systems fo-
cuses on more general hybrid systems.
Also, our approach is not model-checker specific, though
our evaluation in this paper uses PHAVer. In fact, we are
considering integrating our approach with other well-known
model checkers, such as Bogor [32], CellExcite [33] etc..
Arney et al. [34] propose using simple differential equations
to model blood oxygen level. However, the paper just uses the
simple model to demonstrate other designs. The accuracy of
the model itself is not the focus of the paper. Kim et al. [7]
also studied the laser tracheotomy MDPnP. But their focus
is not on hybrid systems model checking. Pajic et al. [35]
propose using random variables and their upper/lower bounds
in the patient model to deal with variations between different
patient populations. This method is orthogonal to our proposal
of online modeling and verification. That is, the two paper
ideas can be combined together to complement each other.
Part of this paper’s ideas are published in our workshop
papers of work-in-progress nature [36][37].
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Through our case study on laser tracheotomy MDPnP, we
show that online model checking of short-run future behavior
can effectively address the two challenges in MDPnP CPS
hybrid systems model checking. By focusing on online and
short-run future, many originally hard to describe/predict
human body parameters become describable and predictable;
and many variable parameters become fixed numerical val-
ues, which greatly simplifies verification. The online model
checking can go real-time if the proposed hard/soft real-
time system co-design patterns are followed. Our empirical
evaluations based on real-world human subject traces show
that our online model checking and co-design approach is
feasible and effective. As future work, we will carry out
more evaluations and integrate/extend our approach to more
comprehensive MDPnP/CPS frameworks [38][39][40][41].
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